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Abstract
A digital signature is like a handwritten signature for a file, such
that it ensures the identity of the person responsible for the file and
prevents any unauthorized changes to the original file. Digital signa-
tures use the same technology as most public key cryptosystems in
which there is a public and private key. Most mathematical operations
are done over a field Zp where p is some large prime. It is possible
to do the same operations over other finite fields. This paper explains
and studies the different finite fields that can be used as well as ways
to implement and experiment with them. It turns out that operations
over Zp run the fastest, but with polynomial basis in a close second.
Normal basis did not prove to be efficient at all. These results turned
out to be against most claims of others, especially in hardware im-
plementations. Large integer libraries are so efficient and fast that is
was hard to beat the times with custom bit manipulation structures.
Various secure signature schemes have proven to be practical and it
is likely that they will be used much more in the near future in many
applications.
1 Introduction
Digital signatures were first invented in the 1970s, they were extremely pop-
ular since they are better than a handwritten signature, unforgeable, and
uncopyable. Today, they are a vital component to business around the world.
Numerous laws, state and now federal, have codified digital signatures into
law. An example of a fully functional program that signs documents which
is widely used today is PGP, also know as ”Pretty Good Privacy”. PGP
has a beautiful interface in which the user can select any file he/she wishes
and with a certain passphrase a signature is generated using a secret key.
There are some people out there who highly disagree with digital signature.
Some say it is way too easy for a rogue program to infiltrate PGP and send
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private information to whomever. Some people say there is no way of ver-
ifying that ”Alice” really signed the message since the computer is really
the one who is doing the calculations. I do not agree with people who make
these accusations since factors such as those are a problem in any situation.
With any cryptographic application there exists the threat of a third person
intercepting information, especially with the abundance of spyware on the
web. It is vital that users check and see if the software they are using is
authentic before they attempt to send cryptographic data through it.
There are many ways of implementing digital signatures, some more ef-
ficient than others, some easier than others. In my project, I am going to
implement ElGamal-type digital signatures along with two different ways of
implementing them; modular arithmetic and Galois fields. I will also discuss
the use of hash functions within digital signatures and some of the attacks
and weaknesses that were developed when hash functions and digital sig-
natures were brought together. There are two main ways of representing
Galois fields, polynomial basis representation and normal basis representa-
tion both of which will be implemented in this project. I will go into the
theory behind finite fields and focus mainly on the efficiency differences be-
tween polynomial basis representation and normal basis representation of
Galois fields, along with irreducible polynomials that are required within.
After understanding the ElGamal signature scheme and Galois fields inde-
pendently, I will show how I will implement the ElGamal signature scheme
over a Galois field.
2 Digital Signatures
When people are asked to authenticate themselves, such as at a bank or a
food store, they are often asked to sign their signature on a piece of paper.
Once a person’s signature is on paper, anybody can compare the signature
to another signature and verify if the two signatures are the same or not.
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Unfortunately this method is often used in our society, regardless of it’s
highly insecure nature. Handwritten signatures have many problems; forg-
ing someone else’s signature is easily accomplished and frequently people do
not sign their name exactly the same way each time. What if we wanted to
attach our signature to a document stored on a computer? There are many
cases when people would like to know who is responsible for a particular doc-
ument, and they would also like to be assured that the requested document
was not tampered with by a nonauthoritative entity. Digital signatures are
a means of signing a document with all of the properties of a handwritten
signature plus additional security. A digital signature is unforgeable without
unreasonable resources. This means that there can be many different signa-
tures for a given plaintext because of the random nature of the algorithm.
It is a computational proof that the signature is based on the document.
Digital signatures convince the receiver of the document that it has been
signed by the claimed signer. A digital signature is not reusable. Once a
document is signed, it can’t be moved to another document. If the document
is altered or the signature is moved to another document then the signature
is no longer valid.
2.1 Primitive Operations Needed
There are some basic operations that are needed in order to implement
the ElGamal signature scheme that operates over binary Galois fields. For
example you must be able to add, subtract, multiply, exponentiate, and
perform multiplicative inverse. Also you must be able to manipulate a large
number of bits and operate with them. Some basic operation needed to
operate with these bits are: shifting, XOR, and copying.
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2.2 Different Domains
The major part of this project is not about digital signatures, it is more
about the implementation that allowed me to perform a digital signature.
The work presented here can easily be ported to other domains such as
Elliptic Curve, RSA, DSA, AES and any others that need operations over
fields.
3 Finite Fields
In abstract algebra, a finite field or Galois field (named in honor of Evariste
Galois) is a field that contains only finitely many elements. Finite fields
are important in number theory, algebraic geometry, Galois theory, cryp-
tography, and coding theory. Since every field of characteristic 0 contains
the rationals and is therefore infinite, all finite fields have prime character-
istic. However, the converse is not true. There exist infinite fields of prime
characteristic.
The multiplicative group of every finite field is cyclic. This means that if
F is a finite field with q elements, then there always exists an element x ∈ F
such that F = 0, 1, x, x2, ..., xq−2.
The element x is not unique. If we fix one, then for any non-zero ele-
ment a in Fq, there is a unique integer n ∈ 0, ..., q − 2 such that a = xn.
The value of n for a given a is called the discrete log of a. In practice,
although calculating xn is relatively trivial given n, finding n for a given
a is a computationally difficult process, and so has many applications in
cryptography.
A finite field, Fq, consists of a set of elements F and two binary opera-
tions on F called addition and multiplication that satisfy some arithmetic
properties. These properties are defined as such:
• Addition in GF (p) is described as, given a, b ∈ Fp, then a + b = z,
8
where z is a + b (mod p)
• Multiplication in GF (p) is described as, given a, b ∈ Fp, then a×b = z,
where z is a× b (mod p)
• Inversion in GF (p) is described as, given a ∈ Fp : a > 0, the inverse of
a, denoted as a−1, is c such that a× c (mod p) = 1
If q is prime, then Zq is the same as Fq. A finite field containing q
elements also exists when q = pm, where p is prime. For efficiency and
security reasons, most cryptosystems and digital signature schemes operate
over Fp where p is prime or F2m . These fields, discovered by Galois, have
order or number of elements equal to p and 2m, respectively. Fp, F2m ,
and Fpm where p is prime are called Galois fields, or also known as GF (p),
GF (2m), and GF (pm), respectively. In the next couple of sections, I will
talk about the two most commonly used finite fields.
3.1 Finite Field GF (p)
If p is a prime, the integers mod p form a field with p elements, denoted as
Zp, Fp or GF (p). Every other field with p elements is isomorphic to this
one.
Galois Field GF (p) arithmetic is easy to implement. In my project I will
be using a large number package so implementing algorithms in GF (p) will
be very easy. Galois Field GF (p) arithmetic, or doing operations mod p,
result in field elements in the range {0, 1, ..., p − 1}. Any operation in this
field will result in one of the field elements.
3.2 Finite Field GF (2m)
If q = pn is a prime power, then there exists up to isomorphism exactly
one field with q elements, written as Fq or GF (q). This field can be con-
structed by finding an irreducible polynomial, f(x) of degree n with co-
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efficients in GF (p). With this we can define the field GF (q) as such,
GF (q) = GF (p)[x]/ < f(x) >. This definition can be broken down to
explain the field better. GF (p)[x] stands for the ring of all polynomials with
coefficients in GF (p). The < f(x) > part of the definition stands for the
ring formed by reducing all polynomials by f(x). The quotient is meant in
the sense of factor rings, the set of polynomials with coefficients in GF (p)
on division by f(x).
The most commonly used nonmodular finite field in cryptographic ap-
plications is the Galois field GF (2m). There exist many algorithms for
representing elements and computing operations in this field very efficiently.
The Galois field GF (2m) is called a binary finite field because it can be rep-
resented in its multiplication table as {0, 1}m elements. Different algorithms
make use of this binary format to manipulate numbers rapidly. For example,
addition in this field is nothing more that XORing the array representation
of field elements. Another way of representing GF (2m) is through a polyno-
mial or normal basis. In the subsequent sections I will go into more detail
of such representation of binary fields.
3.3 Modular Arithmetic
I used GNU’s MP library to perform the large integer arithmetic. This li-
brary is very fast and provides very large precision. The library is fairly
easy to understand, but when you start adding a lot of operations into a
algorithm, the algorithm becomes harder to understand and read. To help
with this problem, I wrote a wrapper class with many overloaded opera-
tions. This allowed me to do simple operations, which are visibly easier to
understand. For example, in order to add two numbers using the library
you would have to call the function:
mpz_add_ui(mpz_t c, mpz_t a, mpz_t b)
with the wrapper class it becomes as easy as doing c = a + b
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3.4 Polynomial Basis Representations of Galois Fields
Given a irreducible polynomial over Zp of the form:
f(x) = xm + am−1xm−1 + ... + a2x2 + a1x + a, where ai ∈ Zp
If we choose a polynomial of this form such that it is irreducible, we can
use it to define a finite field. It defines a finite field because a irreducible
polynomial is analogous to a prime number p which also defines a finite field
Zp. All operations in this polynomial algebra will be reduced modulo f(x),
therefore, we consider f(x) to be the reduction polynomial. Finite fields,
such as Fpm with a polynomial basis are often denoted as, Zp [x]/(f(x)),
where all coefficients are reduced modulo p and the polynomials are reduced
modulo f(x). In the case of a binary finite field 2m, all coefficients are
reduced modulo 2 therefore we can represent any field element as a binary
string of length m.
3.4.1 Reduction Polynomials
Reduction polynomials need to be chosen carefully and also must be irre-
ducible. A irreducible polynomial is a polynomial f(x) such that it can’t be
factored into two polynomials f1(x) and f2(x) of smaller degrees. A trino-
mial over Fpm is a polynomial of the form a1xm + a0xk + 1, where 1 ≤ k ≤
m−1 and ai ≤ p−1. A pentanomial polynomial over Fpm is a polynomial of
the form a3xm + a2xk3 + a1xk2 + a0xk1 + 1, where 1 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ k3 ≤ m− 1
and ai ≤ p − 1. The following are the criteria for choosing a reduction
polynomial over F2:
• If there exists an irreducible trinomial of degree m over F2, then the
reduction polynomial f(x) is recommended to be an irreducible trino-
mial of degree m over F2. To maximize the chances for interoperability,
ANSI X9.62 recommends that the trinomial used should be xm+xk +1
for the smallest possible k such that 0 < k < m.
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• If there does not exist an irreducible trinomial of degree m over F2,
then the reduction polynomial f(x) is recommended to be an irre-
ducible pentanomial of degree m over F2. To maximize the chances for
interoperability, ANSI X9.62 recommends that the pentanomial used
should be xm + xk3 + xk2 + xk1 + 1 chosen according to the following
criteria such that 0 < k1 < k2 < k3 < m:
1. k3 is as small as possible
2. For this particular value of k3, k2 is as small as possible
3. For these particular values of k3 and k2, k1 should be as small as
possible
3.4.2 Testing for Irreducibility
A polynomial can’t be used to define a finite field Fpk unless it is irreducible
over Zp. Therefore, it is important to have a algorithm that can test to see if
a polynomial is irreducible. Although I will not demonstrate how this works,
it can be shown that there is at least 1 irreducible primitive polynomial for
a finite field Fpm . An irreducible polynomial f(x) ∈ Zp[x] of degree m is
called a primitive polynomial if x is a generator of F∗pm , the multiplicative
group of all the non-zero elements in Fpm = Zp[x]/(f(x)). [1]
According to the Applied Handbook of Cryptography a good algorithm
for testing irreducibility of a monic polynomial is as follows:
INPUT: a prime p and a monic polynomial f(x) of degree m in Zp[x]
OUTPUT: an answer to the question: ”Is f(x) irreducible over Zp?”
1. Set u(x)← x
2. For i from 1 to bm2 c do the following:
(a) Compute u(x)← u(x)p (mod f(x))
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(b) Compute d(x) = gcd(f(x), u(x)− x)
(c) If d(x) 6= 1 then return ”reducible”
3. Return ”irreducible”
This algorithm can be iterated many times while changing the value of f(x)
to find a irreducible polynomial.
3.4.3 Addition and Subtraction
Since this project uses binary Galois fields, F2n , all coefficients are reduced
modulo 2. Addition modulo 2 is just exclusive-or since 1+1 = 0 mod 2, 0+
1 = 1, and 0 + 0 = 0. We can add two polynomials extremely fast using a
simple XOR operation. And since there is no carry to propagate, it is even
faster than ususal addition. Polynomial basis, using binary fields, is very
interesting when is comes to addition and subtraction because they turn out
to be exactly the same. This is obvious since 1−1 = 0 and 1+1 = 0 mod 2.
3.4.4 Multiplication
Multiplication in polynomial basis is easy. Multiplying two polynomials is
done the same way as we were taught in grade school; every term in one
polynomial is multiplied by every term in the other. But since we are using
polynomial basis to represent a finite field, we have to reduce the coefficients.
For example:
(x4 + x2 + 1) ∗ (x8 + x6 + x4 + x3 + 1)
In this example we would multiply x4 by (x8 +x6 +x4 +x3 +1) first. The we
would take the answer and add it to x2 ∗(x8 +x6 +x4 +x3 +1) which in turn
would be added to 1∗(x8 +x6 +x4 +x3 +1). For a computer this amounts to
shifting and XORing. Lets call the polynomial (x8 + x6 + x4 + x3 + 1) A for
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simplicity. An algorithm can be devised using nothing more than addition
and left shifts. Lets call the shift left operator <. For example,
(x4 + x2 + 1) ∗ (x8 + x6 + x4 + x3 + 1) = (A < 4) + (A < 2) + (A < 0)
3.4.5 Multiplication Improved
The ”square and multiply” algorithm explained in the previous section is
simple and fast to implement. But there exist many different multiplication
algorithm that can be used for polynomial basis. I tried many different algo-
rithms and found one that worked really well. Also this algorithm operates
more on the WORDs than bits of a polynomial.
INPUT: a = (As−1...A0), b = (Bs−1...B0), f = (Fs−1...F0)
OUTPUT: c = (Cs−1...C0) = ab mod f
Set Ti ← 0; i = 0, ..., 2s− 1
for j from w − 1 down to 0 do
for i from 0 to s− 1 do
if aiw+j 6= 0 then
for k from 0 to s− 1 do
Set Tk+1 ← Tk+i ⊕Bk
if j 6= 0 then T ← xT
Set c← T mod f
return (c)
3.4.6 Squaring
Squaring polynomials in a binary field is a linear operation. The mathemat-
ical formula for squaring a polynomial is as follows:
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(a + b)2 = a2 + 2ab + b2
but since we reduce all coefficients modulo 2, the inside term gets canceled
and we are left with
a2 + b2
Therefore squaring a polynomial in a binary field is no more that just squar-
ing each term separately. In terms of bit strings, there exists a nice simple
algorithm for doing so. Lets take the polynomial x5 + x3 + x2 + 1 repre-
sented as 101101. If we interlace 0’s between each bit we end of with the bit
string 10001010001 with is the polynomial x10 + x6 + x4 + 1. Unfortunately
there is not a nice algorithm for interlacing zero’s between bits, so a square
lookup table had to be created. This table converts a 16bit number to its
32bit square. Squaring polynomials using this method drastically reduced
the time spent in the exponentiation algorithm.
3.4.7 Reduction Algorithm
A fast reduction algorithm is very important in polynomial basis arithmetic.
Since after every operation a reduction is needed, the efficiency of the reduc-
tion algorithm is greatly noticed. The reduction algorithm that I choose to
implement makes use of either a trinomial or pentanomial reduction poly-
nomial. Lets take for an example the reduction polynomial:
x155 + x62 + 1
The reduction of any polynomial mod x155 + x62 + 1 proceeds by reduc-
ing each term in the polynomial by the trinomial reduction polynomial and
subtracting it from the result. The is easily done by a sequence of shifts and
XOR’s. In order to understand this concept it is important to see that
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x155 ≡ x62 + 1 mod F (x)
or more generally
xn ≡ xn−93 + xn−155 mod F (x)
In this example, 93 bits of a polynomial can be reduced at a single time by
replacing each term in the polynomial by it’s congruent two-term expres-
sion. In other words, we can take the upper 93 bits and add it into the
original polynomial right shifted by 93 bits and right shifted by 155 bits.
This algorithm can be repeated over and over until the degree is less than
that of the reduction polynomial.
In terms of implementation, ripping out 93 bits of an expression is more
overhead than wanted. It is best to only use WORDS at a time lowering
the degree of the polynomial by 32 each time. It is important to try and
use a trinomial for the reduction polynomial because you only have to xor
twice. It is also worth noting the degree of the second term. If the difference
between the upper term and the second term is less than 32 then more work
is needed to reduce the polynomial. For example, if I choose to use x150
instead of x62 I would only be able to reduce the polynomial by 5 degrees
each time.
3.4.8 Montgomery Algorithm
Montgomery reduction is a technique which allows efficient implementations
of modular multiplication without explicitly carrying out the classical mod-
ular reduction step. [1] Let m be a positive integer, and let R and T be
integers such that R > m, gcd(m,R) = 1, and 0 ≤ T < mR. A method is
described for computing TR−1 mod m without using the classical modular
multiplication algorithm. TR−1 mod m is called a Montgomery reduction
of T modulo m with respect to R. With a suitable choice of R, a Mont-
gomery reduction can be efficiently computed. [1]
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3.5 Normal Basis Representations of Galois Fields
Another way of representing Galois fields is through the so-called normal
basis. A normal basis of F2m over F2 is of the form {β, β2, β22 , ..., β2m−1}




2i , where ai ∈ {0, 1}. One of the main advantages of
representing elements of a finite field in this form is the efficiency of squaring.
Without getting into the complicated mathematics, squaring ends up to be
a simple rotation of the vector representation. Although multiplication can
be very difficult in this representation, many people use an extension of
normal basis called Gaussian normal basis which helps out a great deal in
multiplication. The Gaussian normal basis records the complexity of the
multiplication operation with respect the the basis. Gaussian normal basis
contains two types, Type I and Type II. The type is used in selecting a
Gaussian normal basis for finite field 2m.
Normal Basis arithmetic started off to be one of the most challenging
aspects of this project, but in the end was not as bad as I had thought. I
had developed a class called NormalBasis which allows me to add, subtract,
multiply, square, and invert elements in a field F2n . This class will only
accept Type I or Type II Optimal Normal Basis. Keeping it this way allowed
the multiplication algorithm to run a lot faster.
3.5.1 Type I ONB
A Type I optimal normal basis exists for the field F2n with the following
conditions:
• n + 1 is prime
• 2 is primitive in Zn+1
This algorithm I wrote will test for a Type I ONB:
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bool NormalBasis::isTypeI(){
BigInt two = 2;
if (is_prime(m + 1))




3.5.2 Type II ONB
A Type II optimal normal basis exists for the field F2n with the following
conditions:
• 2n + 1 is a prime p and either
• 2 is primitive modulo p or
• p ≡ 3(mod4) and the multiplicative order of 2 modulo p is n
This algorithm I wrote will test for a Type II ONB:
bool NormalBasis::isTypeII(){
BigInt test = (m * 2) + 1;






if ((test % 4) == 3){















3.5.3 Addition and Subtraction
Addition and subtraction are very easy in a normal basis. Suppose A, B are









Then addition is defined by:










Since every power in β is linearly independent, addition could be rewritten
as:
A + B =
∑n−1
i=0 (ai + bi) β
2i
Therefore since the ai and bi are added modulo 2, the implementation just
becomes a bit-wise exclusive-OR operation. Also, since 1 and −1 are the
same modulo 2 subtraction is the same as addition.
3.5.4 Squaring
Squaring in normal basis is very fast and efficient. Since every power of β



























= β2n = β
Squaring an element in the field F2n turns out to be a simple circular shift
left.
3.5.5 Multiplication
Multiplication in normal basis elements can be very expensive. Multiplica-








































The trick to multiplication is the λ matrix which needs to be generated.
The λ matrix is generated differently depending of wether it is a Type I or
a Type II ONB.
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3.5.6 Type I Lambda Matrix Generation
For the finite field F2n the lambda matrix will consist of a 2-dimensional ar-
ray of size n x n, consisting of 0’s and 1’s. For every [i, j] in the matrix,[i, j] =
1 iff i and j satisfy one of the two congruences:
2i + 2j ≡ 1 mod n + 1
2i + 2j ≡ 0 mod n + 1
Since 2i + 2j = 2j + 2i is it only necessary to compute half of the matrix.
3.5.7 Type II Lambda Matrix Generation
The lambda matrix for a Type II ONB is the same size and consists of the
same type elements as the Type I lambda matrix. The only difference is
how it is computed. For every [i, j] in the matrix,[i, j] = 1 iff i and j satisfy
one of the 4 congruences:
2i + 2j ≡ 2k mod 2n + 1
2i + 2j ≡ −2k mod 2n + 1
2i − 2j ≡ 2k mod 2n + 1
2i − 2j ≡ −2k mod 2n + 1
3.5.8 Multiplication and Lambda Matrix Improvement
The previously presented multiplication algorithm ran extremely slow. Al-
most 100 times that of everything else. This pushed me into doing more
research on a better multiplication algorithm. The improved algorithm not
only runs in O(n2) as opposed to O(n3), is saves memory also. Since the
lambda matrix of an optimal normal basis contains 2m − 1 non-zero en-
tries, it us unnecessary to construct an M ×M matrix. Since every row in
the lambda matrix contains two non-zero entries, except the first row, we
can use this to our advantage. Instead of the traditional matrix presented
before, all we need is two tables containing the indices’s of the non-zero
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lambda matrix entries. If we call these tables t1 and t2, we can reconstruct
our multiplication algorithm like the following:









Inversion of an element x is represented as x−1 and is defined as:
xx−1 ≡ 1 mod n
For any element, x 6= 0 in F2n the inverse of x can be derived from Fermat’s
Little Theorem as:






The size of a field is very important in cryptographic algorithms. Depending
on the level of security, the recommended field size of discrete logarithm
based cryptosystems is 1024 bits. In my project, the modulus I plan on
testing, for finite field Fp, will be a prime number between 512 bits and 2048
bits. My reasoning for this wide range is for testing purposes only. Likewise,
I will test the same algorithms implemented over a binary field, F2m where
m will range from 512 to 2048. In my project I will only test field sizes up
to 512 bits. There were a few reasons why I did not go past 512 bits. First,
trying to find a 1024 or 2048 bit prime p in which you can factor p−1 proved
too difficult for my factoring algorithm. Second, finding the prime factors
of the order of the field GF (2n) in order to test a generator was too difficult
for my factoring algoritm.
4 The ElGamal Signature Scheme
The ElGamal cryptosystem can’t be used as a signature scheme, although it
can be modified to become one. The ElGamal signature is a non-deterministic,
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probabilistic signature scheme meaning there are many valid signatures for
the same plaintext. In order for the scheme to work, the verification algo-
rithm must be able to validate any of the valid signatures. According to
Stinson, the ElGamal signature scheme is defined as follows:
Let p be a prime such that the discrete logarithm problem in Zp is
intractable, and let α ∈ Z∗p be a primitive element. Let P = Z∗p, A = Z∗p ×
Zp−1, and define
K = {(p, α, a, β) : β ≡ αa mod (p)}
The values p, α, and β are the public key, and a is the private key.
For K = (p, α, a, β), and for a secret random number k ∈ Z∗p−1, define
sigK(x, k) = (γ, δ)
where
γ = αk (mod p)
and
δ = (x− aγ)k−1 (mod p− 1)
For x, γ ∈ Z∗p and δ ∈ Zp−1, define
verK(x, (γ, δ)) = true⇔ βγγδ ≡ αx (mod p)
In the verification part of the scheme, it is easy to prove that this actually
works. Take the formula, βγγδ ≡ αx (mod p) and substitute γ and β from
the defined formulas in the ElGamal scheme. We end up with the formula
αx ≡ αaγ+kδ (mod p). We can see that the exponents have to be congruent,
modulo p − 1 in order for the entire equation to be congruent. We are left
with the formula, aγ + kδ = x (mod p − 1), from the exponents. Solving
this formula for δ we get δ = (x− aγ)k−1 (mod p− 1), which is the original
formula defined in the ElGamal scheme.
23
5 The Generalized ElGamal Signature Scheme
The ElGamal digital signature scheme, described above in the setting of the
multiplicative group Z∗p, can be generalized in a straightforward manner to
work in any finite abelian group G. The algorithm requires a cryptographic
hash function h : {0, 1}∗ −→ Zn where n is the number of elements in G.
It is assumed that each element r ∈ G can be represented in binary so that
h(r) is defined. For example for G = F∗2m .
5.1 Key Generation
Each entity selects a finite group G, a generator of G and public and private
keys. Each entity A should do the following:
• Select an appropriate cyclic group G or order n, with generator α.
• Select a random secret integer a, 1 ≤ a ≤ n − 1. Compute the group
element y = αa
• A’s public key is (α, y), together with a description of how to multiply
elements in G. A’s private key is a.
5.2 Signature Generation
Entity A can sign a binary message m of arbitrary length. In order to sign
the message m, A must do the following:
• Select a random secret integer k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, with gcd(k, n) = 1
• Compute the group element r = αk
• Compute k−1 mod n
• Compute h(m) and h(r)
• Compute s = k−1 {h(m)− ah(r)} mod n
• A’s signature for m is the pair (r, s)
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5.3 Verification
To verify A’s signature (r, s) on m, B should so the following:
• Obtain A’s authentic public key (α, y)
• Compute h(m) and h(r)
• Compute v1 = yh(r) · rs
• Compute v2 = αh(m)
• Accept the signature if and only if v1 = v2
6 Hashing and Attacks on Digital Signatures
Hash algorithms produce a specialized size data block from an arbitrary size
file. Many computer scientists feel that 160 bits provide enough security
for average scenarios. Hashes are often used because it is more efficient and
easier to sign a 160 bit data block rather than a arbitrary length file. It is
important to keep in mind that digital signatures sign the hash of a file and
not the actual file. Because of this, you must be careful not to sacrifice the
security of the system. When hash algorithms are used in digital signature
schemes, the user generating the signature must hash the data first in order
to produce the signature. On the other hand, the user who is verifying
a signature must also hash the plaintext before computing the verification
process. Hash algorithms tend to run fast, so the double hashing required
in a scheme is not a problem. It is convenient to have a hash algorithm as
a standard, such has SHA-1, so that both users know what hash algorithm
was used in the signature scheme.
Certain attacks have been produced that take advantage of some of the
properties of hash algorithms. If one is not careful in choosing a hash al-
gorithm, they can seriously degrade the security of the overall signature.
25
We can assume that Oscar has a valid signed message, (x, y), and y is the
signature of the hash of x, denoted as h(x). Oscar can compute h(x) and
try to find x′ 6= x such that h(x′) = h(x). If Oscar succeeds at this attack,
he then came up with another message, x′ with a valid signature y. This
attack is very much brute force, and Oscar is limited to what x′’s he can
generate. It is also possible for a person to imitate Alice and pretend that
he or she has Alice’s private key. If this is possible, Oscar, pretending to be
Alice, can generate forged signtaures. It is often the practice of including
some identify to a documents to prevent this from happening. Many people
also add a timestamp from a third party trusted source, to signify the time
a message was signed. It is important for a third party source to generate
the time stamp because computer clocks can be easily changed.
6.1 Attack on SHA-1
Over the past few years, reseachers have be improving their analysis in the
area of hash functions. Some of the hash algorithm attacks are; original
differential attack on SHA0, the near collision attack on SHA0, the multi-
block collision techniques, and message modification techniques used in the
collision search arrack on MD5. Because of these past improvements, re-
searchs have now found a way to reduce the amount of operations on a
SHA1 attack. There now exists a very effective way for searching collisions
in SHA1. According to [24], they said that collisions of SHA1 can be found
with complexity less than 269 hash operations. This is the first attack on
the full 80-step SHA1 with complexity less than the 280 theoretical bound.
Based on their estimation, they expect that real collisions of SHA1 reduced
to 70-steps can be found using today’s supercomputers. [24]
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7 Representing Bits
There are many ways in which you can implement the representation of
bits. Since the majority of computation in polynomial basis and normal
basis involves bit manipulation, it is essential that an efficient and fast class
be written to do so. I had a hard time making up my mind on a way to
represent bits which forced me to write 3 different Binary Galois field element
classes to compare. The following is a description of the three methods:
• Array of integers. A simple way of holding a large number of bits would
be to make an array of integers and treat them as if each integer were
a subarray of bits. The best feature of this method is the speed of
XOR. When doing and XOR, it is easy to just XOR the two integers
and step to the next integer. Indexing in this method was not too
bad. First, you must compute which integer to use in the array. Then,
you had to compute which bit along with a mask to extract it. The
downfall to this method is shifting. There is no real nice way to shift
an array of integers. Shifting once is not as bad as when you have to
shift 100 times. The algorithm became long and costly. Because of
this, I was forced to think of different alternatives.
• Double linked list of chars. Although it is inefficient to represent a bit
using 8 bits, I wanted to see if the sacrifice in memory would in turn
make manipulation faster. The majority of bit computation involves
shifting, and in this case it is nothing more that pointer arithmetic.
The downfall to this method is indexing. If I wanted to get the 100th
bit out of 1024 bits, I would have to step through one at a time until
I hit the 100th bit. Second to shifting, many operations have to index
bits. This forced me to come up with my third method.
• Pointer to a single string. This method is much like the last one where
memory is sacrificed in order to increase speed. The nice thing about
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this method is the indexing. Indexing is nothing more than computing
the index in the string and dereferencing it. The problem I faced in
using this method was shifting. I did not want to constantly remake
memory and copy it in order to do a shift. My work around was to
make a separate pointer that kept track of the beginning of the string.
Therefore a single shift was nothing more than a pointer addition.
Although shifting was very fast, there was a downfall to this method.
Since I kept track of the start of the bits, I had to make sure I did not
index out of bounds, meaning when I got to the end of the bit string,
I had to wrap around to the beginning and continue. This forced me
to write a method to compute the next index. When I had to step
through all the bits, that method had to be called which in turn slowed
things down.
7.1 Results
Overall I choose to use an array of integers of bits for a number of reasons.
• I no longer use a class to represent bits, instead I use a structure with
separate helper functions that operate on that structure. I choose this
method to speed up my algorithms by taking out all unnecessary class
overhead. Doing this sped the over all project up by a small amount
but noticeable.
• Replacing my shift algorithm with assembly inline code seemed to help
also. The following inline assembly shows my shift left function.
void shiftL(Bits &src){
asm("movl $0, %%ecx\n\t" //clear the bit, bit in ecx
"movl %0, %%ebx\n\t" //array pointer in ebx
"LOOP:\n\t"
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"movl (%%ebx), %%eax\n\t" //value of array pos in eax
"shl $1, %%eax\n\t" //shift left on position
"addl %%ecx, %%eax\n\t" //add in previous high bit
"movl (%%ebx), %%ecx\n\t" //calculate current high bit
"shr $31, %%ecx\n\t" //shift high bit all the way down
"movl %%eax, (%%ebx)\n\t" //store result
"addl $4, %%ebx\n\t" //get next pointer address
"dec %1\n\t" //decrement array_size
"jnz LOOP" //go back to LOOP if not zero
:
: "r" (src.bits), "r" (src.num_words)
: "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "memory" );
}
• It turns out that my new and improved polynomial multiplication
algorithm does not shift bits to the left by more that one position at a
time. This eliminated the slow algorithm that went along with shifting
many bits either direction.
• The most current and efficient algorithms for polynomial basis work
on WORDs at a time. It seemed logical to use an array of integers of
bits for representing bits because of this reason.
8 Timings
8.1 Addition and Subtraction




















Graph 1: Addition and Subtraction
BigInt GF (p)
Polynomial Basis GF (2n)























Polynomial Basis GF (2n)
Since normal basis multiplication is much slower than modular arith-
metic and polynomial basis, I choose to plot normal basis multiplication in
a separate graph. This allows me to better show the differences of modular
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Polynomial Basis GF (2n)
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Since normal basis exponentiation is much slower than modular arith-
metic and polynomial basis, I choose to plot normal basis exponentiation
in a separate graph. This allows me to show the differences of modular
arithmetic and polynomial basis more clearer. Graph #5 is the graph for























8.4 ElGamal Key Generation
8.4.1 Modular Arithmetic
• Calculate p: Finding a prime p such that you can factor p−1 takes a
small trick. As long as p−1 contains a large prime factor, the security
remains unchanged. Therefore, we can calculate p as, p = (2 ∗ q) + 1
where q is some large prime. With calculating p in this fashion, we
know the factors of p−1 to be 2 and q. But, we can not stop here. It is
possible that p is still not prime. If p still isn’t prime, we must choose
another q and try again. This process is repeated until p = (2 ∗ q) + 1
is prime.
• Find generator α: Knowing the prime factors of p − 1 comes into
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play when trying to find a primitive element of Z∗p for a cyclic group
of order p − 1. Since p is prime we know the order of the group is
p− 1. Let us say we have the prime factor of n to be pe11 pe22 pe33 · · · pekk .
Take any random element α ∈ Z∗p, if αn/pi = 1 for *any* prime factor
pi, then α is not a generator. If this is the case, we must regenerate a
random α and try again. This method of finding a generator may not
be feasible as n is very large since factoring large numbers can be very
time consuming. But, since we choose a p such that p = (2 ∗ q) + 1,
where q is a large prime number, we can easily factor p into prime
factors 2 and q. Now testing α to be primitive is making sure that
α2 6= 1 and αq 6= 1.
• Calculate β: Once p and α are found, producing β is easy. We can
do this with the following formula, β = αa where a is our secret key.
8.4.2 Polynomial and Normal Basis
Since I will be using the generalized ElGamal signature scheme for polyno-
mial basis and normal basis, generating the keys is identical except for the
difference in the set of rules for computation.
• Generating an Irreducible Polynomial: Analogous to generating
a prime p, we must generate an irreducible polynomial in order to
do anything using polynomial basis. Since generating an irreducible
polynomial was discussed earlier, I will not get into it here.
• Forming a Normal Basis: When it comes to implementation, we
really do not need to ”form” a normal basis. Instead we are just
following a set of rules for addition/subtraction and multiplication.
The first step in doing anything would be to construct the lambda
matrix. Once the lambda matrix is made, arithmetic can be performed
as described earlier.
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• Finding a generator α: Finding a generator α is much like finding
a generator in Z∗p. The only difference is the exponentiation process.
• Calculate β: Calculating β is much like before. Its a simple expo-
nentiation of α and the secret key a.
8.4.3 Results
All test results were performed on a AMD Athlon processor running at
1342.69 MHz. The processor has 256MB of cache and 512MB of system
memory. I am running Gentoo Linux r9 with kernel version 2.6.11. All code
was compiled with GCC version 3.3.5-20050130.
TABLE 1
Key Generation Speeds (in seconds)
Field Size Modular Arithmetic Polynomial Basis Normal Basis
23 0.003028 0.012890 0.084034
51 0.023213 0.014249 0.267478
89 0.074626 0.013057 0.770186
131 0.083480 0.015179 1.971897
179 0.107673 0.019041 4.569792
231 0.150032 0.047263 12.850076
281 0.204232 0.024185 11.344309
359 6.157651 0.075664 36.325744
413 16.621062 0.086534 45.913973
473 19.234599 0.177986 104.070822
519 24.863229 0.163944 112.165402
Since much of the key generation involves exponentiation, normal basis key
generation becomes very costly as the size of the field increases. Key gen-
eration using modular arithmetic grew fast also but not nearly as fast as
normal basis. Using polynomial basis arithmetic produced the fastest key
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generation speeds. It is important to calculate the average of many runs
when computing the time it takes to generate a signature. The time it
takes to generate a signature can vary drastically because of the choices the
computer makes when generating a random number. For instance, if the
computer generates a bad p or α it has to go back and retry. This adds a
considerable amount of time to the key generation process.
8.5 ElGamal Signature Generation
8.5.1 Modular Arithmetic
Signing a message using modular arithmetic is straight forward. Given the
keys previously generated, p, α, β with secret key a and a random number
k ∈ Zp−1∗ we can produce a signature for any message we want. It is
important that k ∈ Zp−1∗ , meaning the gcd(k, p − 1) = 1 otherwise the
signature will not verify correctly. The signature is formed as follows,
γ = αk mod p
δ = (x− aγ)k−1 mod p− 1
8.5.2 Polynomial and Normal Basis
Since signing a message using polynomial basis and normal basis is the same
except for the rules of arithmetic, I will put both sections together. It is
not possible to use the same signing method as modular arithmetic. For
example using polynomial basis, if we were to compute γ as in the first half
of the signature, γ would turn out to be a polynomial. But this does us no
good since the second part of the signing algorithms looks for γ to be an
integer. Therefore, we must use the generalized ElGamal signature scheme
to sign messages. Since we are dealing with binary Galois fields, the order
of the field is different than before. We know from the rules of finite fields,
the order of the multiplicative group of a field F2n is 2n − 1. With this new
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order, it is important to pick a random k such that gcd(k, 2n−1) = 1. With
this, we can produce a signature as follows,
r = αk
s = k−1 {h(m)− ah(r)} mod n
where h(m) and h(r) is the hash of message m and r respectively.
8.5.3 Results
Table #2 shows in seconds how long it takes for a signature to be generated.
It is clear that modular arithmetic in GF (p) was the winner. Polynomial
basis wasn’t too far behind. Normal basis proved to be inefficient.
TABLE 2
Signature Generation Speeds (in seconds)
Field Size Modular Arithmetic Polynomial Basis Normal Basis
23 0.000297 0.000341 0.001221
51 0.000632 0.000611 0.015022
89 0.000953 0.001035 0.080900
131 0.001626 0.001922 0.202436
179 0.002201 0.003060 0.479125
231 0.003284 0.004766 1.125449
281 0.004715 0.006789 2.209569
359 0.007193 0.011656 4.259099
413 0.008144 0.016000 6.549010
473 0.009085 0.021403 9.177136
519 0.010674 0.027787 13.799125
Table #3 shows how large of a field we can use when signing a message
for a fixed time. These times do not include the time it takes to hash
the message but they do include the time it takes to hash variables in the
Generalized ElGamal Signature Scheme that was used for polynomial and
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normal basis. The hash algorithm used was MD5. This test proved difficult
where generating a large prime p such that you can factor p − 1. It wasn’t
time consuming to generate a very large prime q, > 2046 bits, it was time
consuming finding the p such that p = 2q + 1. The largest I tried was 2000
bits, and that ran for over an hour. In this graph, I estimated the size for
modular arithmetic based on its growth patterns in the .5, 1.0 and 2.0 time
rows.
TABLE 3
Size of Signature Generated With Fixed Time
Time Modular Arithmetic Polynomial Basis Normal Basis
.001 89 81 23
.002 169 131 29
.005 311 251 39
.01 509 353 51
8.6 ElGamal Signature Verification
8.6.1 Modular Arithmetic
In order to sign a message using modular arithmetic, we first must obtain
the public keys α, β and p. Once this is obtained, we can verify the signature
x, (γ, δ) in the following fashion:
Accept the message if
βγγδ ≡ αx mod p
otherwise reject the message
8.6.2 Polynomial and Normal Basis
Before we can verify a message using polynomial basis or normal basis we
first must obtain the field size. This is important since we also must form a
field to verify the signature. Once a field is formed, and we obtain the public





where h(r) and h(m) is the hash of r and the message respectively
Accept the message if
v1 = v2
otherwise reject the message
8.6.3 Results
Table #4 shows in seconds how long it takes to verify a signature. It is clear
that modular arithmetic in GF (p) was the winner. Polynomial basis wasn’t
too far behind. Normal basis proved to be inefficient.
TABLE 4
Signature Verification Speeds (in seconds)
Field Size Modular Arithmetic Polynomial Basis Normal Basis
23 0.001724 0.002372 0.018652
51 0.002272 0.002941 0.074646
89 0.003014 0.004526 0.261936
131 0.004016 0.007458 0.631102
179 0.005084 0.007746 1.282755
231 0.006575 0.009409 2.200204
281 0.009182 0.012738 3.713323
359 0.010805 0.030659 7.059375
413 0.013019 0.032599 10.604554
473 0.016488 0.040902 14.750914
519 0.018105 0.045287 18.664613
Table 5 shows how large of a field we can use when verifying a message
for a fixed time. As in the last fixed time test, this proved difficult where
generating a large prime p such that you can factor p−1. Since there is such
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a difference between the timing of Normal Basis vs. Polynomial Basis and
modular arithmetic, it was difficult to compare. For this reason, I had to
leave out Normal Basis. The smallest jump in field size using normal basis
exceeded the possibility of even computing the keys for a comparable field
size of the other representations.
TABLE 5
Size of Signature Verification With Fixed Time







9.1.1 Addition and Subtraction
Addition and subtraction are noting more that an XOR in binary Galois
fields. Since XOR’s two list of words takes stepping through the words, the
complexity for addition and subtraction is O(n) where n is the amount of
words in the list. The following algorithm implements addition and subtrac-
tion.
void XOR(Bits &dest, Bits &src1, Bits &src2){
for (unsigned int i = 0; (i < dest.num_words) &&
(i < src1.num_words) &&
(i < src2.num_words); i++) {





Multiplication is a pretty costly algorithm measuring in at O(nlog(n)) in
it’s worse case. Here is the algorithm on how to multiply two polynomials.
void PolynomialBasis::mult(Bits &dest, Bits &x, Bits &y){
unsigned int s = x.num_words;
Bits T;
unsigned int i, k;
int j;
allocate_words(T, (2 * s));
for (j = WORD_B - 1; j >= 0; j--){
for (i = 0; i <= (s - 1); i++){
if (get_bit(x, (i * WORD_B) + j)){
for (k = 0; k <= (s - 1); k++){













The nested for loops is where most of the computation is done. You can
see here that if every term in x was set, then the complexity would be
O(WORDB ∗ n ∗ n) or just O(n2).
9.1.3 Squaring
Squaring a polynomial is really fast. Using the table lookup method de-
scribed earlier, squaring a polynomial can be done in O(n), where n is the
amount of WORDs needed to represent a polynomial. Here is the squaring
algorithm for reference.
void PolynomialBasis::square(Bits &dest, Bits &src){
Bits T;
unsigned int index = 0;
allocate_words(T, (2 * src.num_words));
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < src.num_words; i++){
T.bits[index++] = square_lookup[src.bits[i] & 0xFFFF];
T.bits[index++] = square_lookup[src.bits[i] >> 16];
}
reduce(T);






Exponentiation is a combination of squares and multiplies. Therefore, it’s
worst case is because of multiplication with was O(n2). Here is the expo-
nentiation algorithm for reference.
void PolynomialBasis::expon(Bits &dest, Bits &x, BigInt amt){
BigInt r = 0;




allocate_words(T, 2 * x.num_words);
// get the exponent in reverse
while (amt != 0){
r = r * 2;
r = r + (amt & 1);





if (r & 1){
mult(dest, dest, x);
}






9.2.1 Lambda Matrix Generation
Generating the lambda matrix is not quick. The complexity falls under
O(m) where m is the size of the field. Here is the algorithm to show where
I got the complexity from.
void NormalBasis::generate_lambda1(){
BigInt foo, two, zero, one;
zero = 0; one = 1; two = 2;
bool gotfirst = false;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < m; i++){
for (unsigned int j = 0; j < m; j++){
foo = (two ^ i) + (two ^ j);
foo = foo % (m + 1);














9.2.2 Addition and Subtraction
Addition and subtraction is the same as in polynomial basis. It is a simple
step through of WORD and XOR operations. Therefore, the complexity
of normal basis addition and subtraction is O(n). Since it uses the same
algorithm as in polynomial basis, I will not list the code here.
9.2.3 Multiplication
Multiplication in normal basis is slow. The complexity for the multiplication
algorithm is O(m2) where m is the size of the field. Here is the multiplica-
tion algorithm for reference:
void NormalBasis::mult(Bits &dst, Bits &x, Bits &y){
unsigned int tmp1, tmp2;
tmp1 = tmp2 = 0;
for (unsigned int k = 0; k < dst.num_bits; k++){
tmp1 = get_bit(x, k) * get_bit(y, (table1[0] + k) % y.num_bits);
for (unsigned int i = 1; i < x.num_bits; i++){
tmp2 ^= (get_bit(x, (k + i) % x.num_bits) *
(get_bit(y, (table1[i] + k) % y.num_bits) ^
get_bit(y, (table2[i] + k) % y.num_bits) ));
}









Squaring is one of the most efficient algorithm in normal basis. Since squar-
ing is a simple circular shift left, the complexity of the square operation is
O(n) where n is the amount of WORD needed to represent a field element.
Here is an example of squaring a field element in normal basis.
void circ_shiftL(Bits &src){
WORD bit = src.bits[src.num_words - 1] &






Exponentiation is a combination of squares and multiplies. Therefore, it’s
worst case is because of multiplication with was O(m2). Here is the expo-
nentiation algorithm for reference.
void NormalBasis::expon(Bits &dst, Bits &x, BigInt pow){
BigInt r = 0;
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// get the exponent in reverse
while (pow != 0){
r = r * 2;
if (pow & 1)
r = r + 1;
pow = pow / 2;














My goal of this section is to explain how to use the program written in
order to sign and verify messages. All code was written in C++ on a linux
machine. The user will need to have libmhash and libgmp installed in order
to use this program.
10.1 Generating Parameters
I felt it was important to separate parameter generation from the rest of
the program. Since it would be inefficient for a server to regenerate pa-
rameters ever time its wants to sign a message, it would be helpful to save
the parameters into a text file for a later date. Before a user can attempt
to sign a message he/she must first generate parameters. This is done by
executing the genParams executable. By default this program will output
a ”params” file with a list of the given parameters for field size 131. If you
wish to change the field size, this can easily be done by passing the exe-
cutable the command line argument ”-fs x” where x is the desired field size.
Since polynomial and normal basis generation depends on the field size, not
all field sizes will work. For instance, it is essential that polynomial and
normal basis algorithms know the factors of the order of the field. To help
in finding the factors of the order, a data file called ”faclookup” exists in
the working directory. If the field is not listed there, the basis will not be
formed. If the user insists on using that field, he or she is responsible for
adding the factors into the database file. In addition to the field size having
to be listed in the data base, it must also be of Type I or Type II normal
basis, otherwise the user will not be able to sign or verify using normal basis.
It is important to pay attention to the output of ”genParams” to make sure
all parameters are generated successfully.
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10.2 Signing a Message
Signing a message is easily done with the command sign. The executable
must receive at least 1 parameter, being the message to sign. By default, the
sign program will use modular arithmetic to sign the message. If this is not
what the user wants, he or she can change this to polynomial or normal basis
by passing the ”-poly” or ”-norm” switch, respectively. Signing a message
will result in a file created containing the signature. The name of the file
created is the name of the input message file plus a ”.sig” extension added
to the end.
10.3 Verifying a Message
Verifying a message is very simple. All that need to be done is, ”verify
message” where message is the name of the file that was originally signed.
There is no need to pass the verify executable the signature file, it will
automatically look for it and terminate if not found.
11 Area’s of Improvment
Much of my research told me that using a Galois Field GF (2m) represented
with a polynomial basis would outperform standard modular arithmetic in
GF (p). Since my results did not show this, I spent a great deal of time
trying to improve my representation of polynomials. There is a really in-
teresting alternative for representing a finite field GF (2m). According to
[7] we can represent field elements as polynomials with coefficients in the
smaller field GF (216). Calculations in this smaller field are carried out us-
ing pre-calculated lookup tables. The nice thing about this representation
is that the field GF (216) can be represented in a single computer WORD.
It is well known that a field can be considered as a vector space over one
of its subfields. The proper subfields of GF (2n) are the fields GF (2r), with
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r|n and 0 < r < n. [7] My implementation of polynomials left me with a
large number of bitwise operations. Some operations had me testing single
bits and shifting words around. This is inefficient since most computers are
designed for WORD operations.
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